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In order to refer using a name, speakers must believe that their addressee knows about
the link between the name and the intended referent. In cases where speakers and
addressees learned a subset of names together, speakers are adept at using only the
names their partner knows. But speakers do not always share such learning experience
with their conversational partners. In these situations, what information guides speakers’
choice of referring expression? A speaker who is uncertain about a names’ common
ground (CG) status often uses a name and description together. This N+D form allows
speakers to demonstrate knowledge of a name, and could provide, even in the absence
of miscommunication, useful evidence to the addressee regarding the speaker’s knowledge.
In cases where knowledge of one name is associated with knowledge of other names,
this could provide indirect evidence regarding knowledge of other names that could
support generalizations used to update beliefs about CG. Using Bayesian approaches to
language processing as a guiding framework, we predict that interlocutors can use their
partner’s choice of referring expression, in particular their use of an N+D form, to generate
more accurate beliefs regarding their partner’s knowledge of other names. In Experiment
1, we find that domain experts are able to use their partner’s referring expression choices
to generate more accurate estimates of CG. In Experiment 2, we find that interlocutors
are able to infer from a partner’s use of an N+D form which other names that partner is
likely to know or not know. Our results suggest that interlocutors can use the information
conveyed in their partner’s choice of referring expression to make generalizations that
contribute to more accurate beliefs about what is shared with their partner, and further,
that models of CG for reference need to account not just for the status of referents, but
the status of means of referring to those referents.
Keywords: common ground, reference, perspective-taking, belief-updating, conversation
1. INTRODUCTION
One of the most basic things we do with language is refer to things in the world. When we say
something like, “Can you bring me the ball?,” we are using the definite noun phrase the ball to
refer to a particular ball in the world, and we’re hoping that our addressee will be able to execute
the requested action. In order to successfully refer, speakers must choose a referring expression
that can be understood by their addressee(s), and this requires speakers to take into account what
is in common ground (CG): the knowledge that is shared between conversational partners. This
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is particularly relevant when we consider the many choices for
definite referring expressions—we can refer via a possessive, as
in my ball, a definite description, as in the ball with smudges on
it, a pronoun, as in it, or a proper name, as in Wilson - each
of which assumes a different knowledge and attentional state on
the part of the addressee (Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Gundel et al.,
1993; Roberts, 2004), and can reflect the status of the referent in
the preceding discourse (e.g., Ariel, 1990; Lambrecht, 1994). For
proper names in particular, speakers need to know not just that
the referent itself is in CG, but that their partner knows it by that
name. What sources of information are available and used as the
basis for our beliefs about what someone else knows, such that we
could use this information in guiding our choices about what to
say?
A major debate within the literature on CG focuses on the
presumed computational complexity of generating and using
representations of our partner’s knowledge during language
production or comprehension. An influential account fromClark
and Marshall (1978, 1981) suggested that interlocutors could
rely on elaborate “reference diaries” in memory, which enable
them to find instances of “triple co-presence” between the
speaker, addressee, and referent, and thus safely assume that
a particular referent is mutually known. However, these rich
representations strike many as psychologically implausible. Some
alternate proposals hold that we are by nature egocentric, and
instead of using information about their partner’s knowledge or
perspective, interlocutors use a heuristic: they assume that their
own perspective or knowledge can serve as a proxy for what their
interlocutor will know (e.g., Keysar et al., 2000; Wu and Keysar,
2007). Under these accounts, taking a partner’s perspective into
account requires effortful adjustment and monitoring processes,
after something has gone awry. Several studies do suggest we
are susceptible to making errors about what others know (e.g.,
Fussell and Krauss, 1992; Epley et al., 2004; Birch and Bloom,
2007), and that in particular, we fall victim to a “Curse of
Knowledge” effect: we systematically assume that people know
what we know.
But other researchers, such as Brown-Schmidt and Hanna
(2011), argue that CG information is one of many partial
constraints on language processing and production, and that
information about ground status can, at least in cases where
the cues to it are strong enough, influence language processing
and production from the earliest moments. Brown-Schmidt and
Hanna (2011) give an excellent overview of this debate, and
point to a number of studies in which there is solid evidence
for the use of CG as a constraint in both comprehension and
production (e.g., Nadig and Sedivy, 2002; Clark and Krych,
2004; Brown-Schmidt et al., 2008; Brennan and Hanna, 2009;
Brown-Schmidt, 2012). Studies from Heller et al. (2012) and
Gorman et al. (2013) on referring expression choice, which we
summarize in the following section, also lend support to this
view of CG. The experiments we present in this paper build
off this earlier work to ask whether interlocutors are capable
of using the information conveyed by their partner’s choice of
referring expression to update their beliefs about what their
partner knows.
1.1. Previous Work Using Names to Study
CG-Use in Production
Proper names are arbitrary labels that can only be understood if
the addressee knows the link between the label and the referent,
and as such, they are ideal tools for exploring the use of CG in
production. By teaching overlapping but non-identical sets of
names to partners, it is possible to set up situations in which a
name is either privileged (known only to one of the partners) or
shared (known to both partners); in order to refer felicitously,
speakers should only use those names which they know to be
shared. Wu and Keysar (2007) used this paradigm to test their
hypothesis that speakers use an “information overlap” heuristic
to estimate common ground; they argued that instead of tracking
the ground status of individual items, speakers instead rely on
their estimate of the overall overlap between their own knowledge
and their partner’s. Indeed, in the high overlap cases (where
speakers learned most names with their partner, and only a
few were learned alone), they found that speakers used more
privileged names than in the low overlap cases (where only a few
of the names were shared).
However, in their replication of the Wu and Keysar (2007)
study, Heller et al. (2012) found that in those cases where
speakers used names for privileged items, these names were
almost exclusively uttered along with a description, in what they
(following Isaacs and Clark, 1987) call the “Name+Description”
(N+D) form. Speakers included information that was necessary
for their addressees to successfully identify the referent; evidence
from additional studies suggested that these descriptions were
not simply added as a repair or as a result of miscommunication,
but were planned as part of the utterance from the beginning.
This suggests that speakers are quite sensitive to the knowledge
of their addressees, and skilled at tracking which names are
shared, and which are privileged, when the basis for the shared
knowledge is shared learning experience. The Name-Alone (N)
form is reserved for those items which the speaker believes to be
shared, and the N+D form reflects either a belief that that the
item is privileged, or a lack of certainty about the item’s ground
status. But why use the name at all, when the addressee does
not know it? Heller et al. (2012) suggested that the use of the
N+D formmay reflect a teaching strategy; if the speaker believed
that they may need to refer to the item on subsequent turns,
then it makes sense to use the name along with a description,
rather than just a description, in order to “teach” the name to the
partner. However, Gorman et al. (2013) explicitly disincentivized
teaching by informing participants that they would only see each
item once, and found that instead of decreasing their use of
the N+D form for privileged items, speakers increased it; post-
test debriefings further suggested that these speakers did not
believe they were teaching names to their addressee. Though
this indicates that speakers were not strategically teaching the
names to their addressee via the N+D form, this does not mean
that addressees would have been incapable of learning something
from the speakers’ use of the N+D form; we will return to this
possibility shortly.
Building off the work of Heller et al. (2012), we conducted a
series of studies (described in Gorman et al., 2013) exploring the
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memory representations that support CG use during language
production. We based our approach on the framework presented
by Horton and Gerrig (2005a,b), who propose that information
about CG is represented as a by-product of ordinary memory
processes, which contain context-specific episodic traces. Results
from the spoken word recognition literature suggest that people
might indeed have automatic access to speaker-specific episodic
traces for names (Goldinger, 1998; Creel et al., 2008; Creel and
Tumlin, 2011). Work on lexical precedents from Metzing and
Brennan (2003) and Brown-Schmidt (2009) also demonstrates
that addressees can use speaker-specific information when
comprehending referring expressions (but cf Kronmüller and
Barr, 2015). In short, it seems the representations upon which
language use depends (e.g., word representations) already encode
speaker-specific information. This might explain how such
purportedly rich CG representations as the ones described by
Clark and Marshall (1978, 1981) could be used during real
time conversation. Our conversational partner and everything
about the context in which we are speaking to them serve
as cues that make associated information more accessible in
memory. One major question, then, is precisely what kind of
information needs to be accessible in memory. When we decide
we want to refer to something, it seems we need information
about whether that referent is “shared” with our addressee (to
support what Horton andGerrig, 2005a would call “commonality
assessment”), but also about whether a particular means of
referring to that referent is likewise “shared” (to support what
they would call “message formation”). That is, rather than
“triple co-presence,” it seems we need evidence for a sort of
“quadruple co-presence”: evidence that we, our addressee, the
referent, and the means of referring to it have all been “co-
present.” Our work has been aimed at probing the factors that
can support inferences regarding the status of particular means of
referring to particular referents with a particular conversational
partner.
In the studies reported in Gorman et al. (2013), participants
learned novel names for novel creatures during the training
phase, then interacted during the testing phase in a referential
communication game using those creatures. One participant
was named the Director, and either learned shared names
alongside their partner (the together condition), or learned
them separately but were told that their partner learned those
same names (the alone condition). In both conditions, the
Director went on to learn a set of privileged names that were
not learned by their partner. These studies found support for
the Horton and Gerrig (2005a,b) claim that shared experience
should enable the development of episodic memory traces
linking the speaker, the addressee, and the referents, and thus
support the use of CG during production: Directors were
far better at avoiding the use of the N form for privileged
items in the together condition than in the alone condition,
where such episodic memory traces would not be present.
However, even in the alone condition, Directors were still much
more likely to use the N form for shared items than for
privileged items; even without the benefit of shared experience,
Directors were still able to use what they had been told about
their partner’s knowledge, though not nearly as successfully as
when the shared knowledge was established through shared
experience.
Interestingly, Directors in the alone condition were also more
likely to use the N+D form for privileged names than Directors
in the together condition, suggesting that use of the N+D form
may reflect greater uncertainty about the ground status of items.
One possibility is that the collaborative learning in the together
condition aided speakers because it provided better context cues
to distinguish between shared and privileged information, not
just because of partner-specific episodic memory cues. For the
Directors in the alone condition, almost nothing distinguishes
shared and privileged names in memory, since both are learned
in isolation. In contrast, in the together condition, many pairs
collaboratively created memory cues to help remember the
names, and the context in which shared names were learned
(interacting with another person and the experimenter) and the
context in which privileged names were learned (sitting alone
with the experimenter) were quite different. As such, another
study reported in Gorman et al. (2013) aimed to explore whether
the relevant memory cues depend on partner-specific shared
learning. A third-party condition was introduced, in which the
Director learned shared names together with a partner, but this
partner was not the same partner with whom they would interact
in the referential communication task; the Director was simply
told that their new partner had learned the same names as their
earlier partner. Thus, the shared names were still established
via shared experience, but that experience then needed to be
generalized to the new partner. It was found that in the third-
party condition, Directors did nearly as well at avoiding the use
of the N form for privileged items as Directors in the together
condition, but were far more likely to use the N+D form for both
shared and privileged items than Directors from either of the
other conditions. Directors in the third-party condition were able
to generalize their shared experience with a third party to their
new partner, but were again left with greater uncertainty about
the ground status of individual items.
While partner-specific episodic memory traces may be a
powerful influence on speakers’ ability to use information about
the ground status of an item and its name, they are clearly
not the only information available to speakers; simply being
told what another person has learned was enough to generate
at least some use of ground information by the speakers, and
learning shared vs. privileged names in more distinguishable
contexts helps. This raises a question as to what kinds of
representations speakers might be creating in order to accurately
remember (or generate expectations about) what names are
shared with a particular addressee and to use them (relatively)
appropriately, and what kinds of information allow speakers
to successfully generalize beyond their direct shared experience
with a conversational partner. This is a particularly important
question to investigate: we often interact with people with whom
we do not share experience, but do share knowledge. Thus,
we need to be able to go beyond the direct evidence that
comes from shared experience—to make inferences about our
partner’s knowledge, and generalize beyond those inferences.
Our results from Gorman et al. (2013) suggest a potential
basis for inferences about shared knowledge based on common
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community membership (Clark and Marshall, 1978, 1981).
Speakers are more likely to use the N+D form when they do
not share learning experience with their partner; this allows them
to use a name without assuming that their partner knows the
name. The speakers’ use of this name, in turn, could serve as
a cue to the addressee that the speaker is indeed a member of
the same community, and thus support a generalization: that
the speaker knows other names associated with that community.
This chain of inferences and generalizations could support
more accurate estimates of CG information over the course
of conversation—even when there is no miscommunication
between interlocutors.
1.2. Motivation for Current Experiments
Recall that the strongest evidence used to support the argument
that speakers are egocentric comes from demonstrations of the
“Curse of Knowledge”: the seemingly irrational belief that others
know what we know. But is this really so irrational? Consider
the task facing speakers interacting with a partner with whom
they don’t share learning experience: they must adapt to their
conversational partner’s knowledge in order to refer successfully.
Speakers typically interact with partners who are relatively similar
to themselves (this is especially true in experiments that involve
pairs of college students). In Bayesian terms, people’s apparent
initial egocentricity may be the result of strong prior expectations
that their partner knows what they know (perhaps tempered by
the degree to which they see their partner as similar to themselves,
and their prior experiences with similar conversational partners
and similar conversational contexts). By starting with their own
knowledge as a prior estimate of their partner’s knowledge,
speakers are arguably behaving more rationally than if they used
a completely unbiased prior estimate.
Over the course of conversation, interlocutors will be
exposed to evidence regarding their partner’s knowledge that
they could use to update their expectations about what is
shared. Recall that Heller et al. (2012) and Gorman et al.
(2013) showed that a speaker who is uncertain about a names’
CG status often uses the N+D form. This form allows the
speaker to demonstrate knowledge of a name without making
assumptions regarding whether that name is shared. It thus could
provide useful evidence to the addressee regarding the speaker’s
knowledge—and this evidence is available even in the absence of
miscommunication. This type of evidence could be particularly
useful as a cue to common discourse community membership,
if knowledge of one name is associated with knowledge of
other names (as in domains where varying levels expertise are
associated with use of particular names). Do interlocutors attend
to and use this evidence to rationally update their expectations
about their partner’s knowledge? We explored this hypothesis
in two experiments where choice of referring expression could
serve as a cue to knowledge of other names. In Experiment 1, we
find that domain experts are able to use their partner’s referring
expression choices to generate more accurate estimates of CG. In
Experiment 2, we find that interlocutors are able to infer from a
partner’s use of an N+D form which other names that partner is
likely to know or not know.
2. EXPERIMENT 1: CG BELIEF-UPDATING
IN UNSCRIPTED TASK-ORIENTED DIALOG
In Experiment 1, we embedded the task of name learning in
the context of a rich “toy” world by creating a role-playing
game in which certain levels are always encountered before
others, and the participant’s choices can make regions of the
world (and the information contained there) inaccessible; this
makes it possible that a speaker displaying knowledge of one
name can implicate that they also have knowledge of the names
learned prior to that one in the game. We hypothesized that
domain experts could use their partner’s referring expression
choices to update their beliefs regarding their partner’s domain-
specific knowledge. We asked the following questions: would
Expert’s initial beliefs about shared knowledge reflect partner-
specific information when available? Could the partner’s referring
expression choices provide a useful cue to the set of names known
by that partner? Would Experts adjust their beliefs about partner
knowledge on the basis of their partner’s referring expression
choices? And could Experts generalize, inferring that one name
is known given a display of knowledge of another name?
2.1. Methods
2.1.1. Participants
Two native English speakers from the University of Rochester
were recruited to serve as Game Experts and were paid hourly
rates for their participation. A further 32 native English speakers
from the University of Rochester were paid to participate as
novice gamers. Four naive participants were brought in for each
2-day experimental session. All participants signed a written
consent form which was approved by the Research Subjects
Review Board of our institution.
2.1.2. Materials
Three novel clipart images of “cute monsters” from clipart.com
were modified to create nine unique creatures: 3 Wugs, 3 Lorks,
and 3 Greps. The individual Wugs, Lorks, and Greps were
distinguished by a “feature” designed to resemble a rune, created
using the paintbrush in GIMP, drawn on the creature’s belly;
each feature was assigned an invented name that was one (CVC)
syllable in length, and designed to be easily distinguishable from
other feature names. Each creature was assigned an invented
name (e.g., “Gramperoo”). These creatures were presented over
the course of the game. Figure 1 illustrates three sample creatures
and all six features used in the game.
FIGURE 1 | Experiment 1: example creatures and features.
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2.1.3. Procedure
2.1.3.1. Expert training
In order to create Experts who had full knowledge of everything
in the game, each Expert was given a copy of the Game Book
(which contained the “story” of the game, along with names
and other information about each creature within the game) and
specific training. On Day 1, the experimenter took the role of
guide, and led the Experts through the game as naive participants.
Then the Experts were given 3 weeks to study the Game Book.
Experts were quizzed weekly on their memory for the names and
other information contained in each level of the game. By the end
of training, Experts completed these quizzes with no errors.
2.1.3.2. Day 1
In order to create a situation through which Experts could
develop structured shared knowledge with participants, each
Expert guided two participants through the role playing game,
one at a time. The Expert read the story from the Game Book
to the participant, told the participant when to move their
game piece on the Game Board, informed the participant of the
result of dice rolls and gift choices, and quizzed them on names
and other information at the relevant points during the game.
Participants played the game twice with the Expert; most did not
make it to the final stages of the game.
2.1.3.3. Day 2
A new set of Expert-participant pairings was created: each
Expert interacted with one of the participants they’d guided the
previous day, and one of the participants the other Expert had
guided.Table 1 illustrates the pairings; the order was randomized
(Participant A was not always first). This allowed us to explore
both partner-specific knowledge and inferences rooted in general
expectations for what an unfamiliar game-player might know.
The Experts and Participants completed the following series
of tasks on Day 2: a Pre-Test, a Matching Task, a Mid-Test, a SET
game, and a Post-Test.
2.1.4. Pre-Test
2.1.4.1. Expert
In order to probe the Expert’s expectations about their Day
2 partner’s knowledge, the Expert was given a worksheet with
images of each of the runes and each creature and marked a
spot on an 11cm line representing their belief (from “most likely
no” to “most likely yes”) regarding the likelihood that the Day
2 partner knew the name. The location of the marks were later
measured using a ruler and recorded in a spreadsheet.
TABLE 1 | Expert-participant pairings.
Day 1 Day 2
Expert 1: Expert 2: Expert 1: Expert 2:
Participants
A and B
Participants
C and D
Participants
A and C
Participants
B and D
2.1.4.2. Participant
In order to establish what the naive participants actually
remembered from their Day 1 experience, the naive participants
were given a separate worksheet containing images of each of the
runes and each creature. They indicated whether they had learned
each name, and wrote down the name as they remembered it.
2.1.4.3. Matching Task
The Expert and participant completed a Matching task using
cards printed with images of each of the creatures learned in the
game, as well as three novel creatures, created using the three
family body-shapes, but with rune-markings on the belly that did
not correspond to any of the learned characters. The participant
and Expert sat in the same room with their backs to one another,
so that they could hear each other speaking but could not see
the each other’s cards. The experimenter placed the cards in
a specific order on the participants’ table, and then placed the
corresponding cards on the Expert’s table, in a different specific
order. The participant was told to work with the Expert until the
cards on the Expert’s table were in the same order as the cards on
their own table, and the pair was encouraged to converse freely
as they worked to accomplish the task. The Matching Task was
chosen to provide an opportunity for the naive participant to use
the names (and thus provide evidence about their knowledge to
the Expert). Their conversation was recorded and transcribed.
Transcriptions were later annotated by the experimenter, who
marked each reference to a character or rune and tagged it as
belonging to one of three categories: Name Alone (N), Name +
Description (N+D), or Description Alone (D).
2.1.5. Mid-Test
2.1.5.1. Expert
In order to assess changes in the Expert’s beliefs regarding their
partner’s knowledge following the Matching Task, the Expert was
given a second copy of the worksheet they completed in the
Pre-Test to complete after the Matching task.
2.1.5.2. Participant
The naive participant was given a new worksheet, on which
they answered questions regarding the difficulty of the Matching
task, and their strategy for referring to creatures they knew and
creatures they did not know.
2.1.5.3. SET task
The participant and Expert were seated as in the Matching Task.
Each set of cards from the Matching Task were shuﬄed so that
they were in random order; each set was arranged in 3 rows of 4.
The Expert and participant were told to work together to form
“sets” of cards that shared some common characteristic (e.g.,
physical appearance, the jobs or territories of the creatures, or
the sounds of the creatures’ names). The SET task was chosen
as a “targeted language game” (Brown-Schmidt and Tanenhaus,
2008; Tanenhaus and Brown-Schmidt, 2008), designed to elicit
conversation regarding what each participant knew about the
creatures. The Expert and participant took turns choosing two
cards from their set of cards; their partner’s job was to choose
a card from their set of cards that would complete a set with
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the first two cards that were chosen. They were encouraged to
choose their two cards carefully when it was their turn, so that
their partner had the best chance of being able to complete a
set. The Expert and participant were allowed to tell their partner
what characteristic they had in mind for the set, but could not
coach their partner on which specific card to use. The Expert and
participant were each given one “PASS” to use if they could not
complete a set, and were told the goal was to use as many cards as
they could before using their PASSes. The conversations and card
choices were recorded and transcribed. The transcriptions were
later annotated by the experimenter, who marked each reference
to a character or rune and tagged it as belonging to one of 3
categories: N, N+D, or D.
2.1.6. Post-Test
2.1.6.1. Expert
In order to assess changes in the Expert’s beliefs following the SET
task, the final worksheet asked Experts to give a final YES/NO
judgment regarding their partner’s knowledge of names, and
also asked about changes in their beliefs about their partner’s
knowledge from the game over the course of completing the two
tasks, and their strategy during the SET task.
2.1.6.2. Participant
The final worksheet asked questions regarding the difficulty of
the SET task and their strategies during the SET task, as well as
questions about their memory for the names of the creatures and
runes, how often they thought they’d used the names, and their
strategy for referring to creatures or runes whose names they did
not know.
2.2. Experiment 1 Results
2.2.1. Experts’ Initial Beliefs
We first assessed the Expert’s initial beliefs and explored the
extent to which these beliefs relate to the knowledge of their Day 2
partner. We converted the Experts’ Pre-Test number-line ratings
into YES/NO judgments by norming them to a value between 0
and 1, and assigning estimates below 0.5 to NO and estimates
above 0.5 to YES. If the partner had answered “no” or gave an
incorrect name for an item in the Pre-Test, they were coded as
not knowing the name; if they answered “yes” and gave a correct
name for an item, they were coded as knowing the name. Experts
were correct in their Pre-Test judgments about which names their
partner knew and did not know 80% of the time when they were
working with the same partner as on Day 1, and 68% of the time
when they were working with a different partner than on Day 1,
which suggests some use of partner-specific information. Table 2
compares the expectation of the Expert regarding whether their
Day 2 partner knew a particular name with the actual knowledge
of that partner, as indicated by the partner’s Pre-Test responses.
Incorrect judgments are bolded. Note that there does appear to be
a “Curse of Knowledge” effect in the Experts’ response patterns,
particularly when the Expert is working with a different partner
on Day 2 than on Day 1: Experts assume their partner knows
a name when it is not actually known 27.6% of the time when
working with the partner, and 42.7% of the time when working
with a different Day 2 partner.
However, Experts’ basis for their beliefs regarding partner
knowledge is more likely to be the experience in the game itself
on Day 1, during which their partners may have learned names
that were subsequently forgotten by Day 2, and thus in Table 3,
we present the percentages of correct and incorrect judgments
about partner knowledge broken down by what their partner
actually learned, rather than what they report remembering on
Day 2; note the dramatic reduction in incorrect judgments about
knowledge status for items that the Expert expects to be known
(from 27.6 to 2% for the same partners, and from 42.7 to 11.7%
for different partners).
To test whether Expert’s judgements reflect parter-specific
information, we modeled the accuracy (based on their partner’s
Day 2 Pre-Test knowledge) of Experts’ Pre-Test Yes/No
judgments about whether a particular item was known using a
mixed effects logistic regression model with the partner’s status
(same as Day 1 or different) as a fixed effect, along with random
effects for the partner, Expert, and item. We found a significant
main effect of the partner’s status, such that Experts were more
likely to be accurate in their judgments about whether their
partner knew a particular item if their partner was the person
they had played the game with on the previous day (β = 0.82,
S.E. = 0.39, p < 0.05). But when we add Game Experience
(whether or not a name was learned by the partner on Day
1) to this model, the partner’s Day 2 knowledge is no longer
a significant predictor; instead, we find a main effect of Game
Experience, such that Experts’ ratings of the likelihood that their
partner knows a name are significantly higher when that name
was learned during Day 1 (β = 1.16, S.E. = 0.38, p < 0.01),
and there is no interaction with partner status, likely due to the
TABLE 2 | Expert’s Pre-Test judgments of what Day 2 Partner knows and
does not know, compared to the Partner’s actual knowledge (based on
Pre-Test).
Knows (%) Doesn’t Know
(%)
SAME PARTNER
Expert expects Known (33.8% of responses) 72.4 27.6
Expert expects Unknown (66.2% of responses) 15.2 84.8
DIFFERENT PARTNER
Expert expects Known (15.5% of responses) 57.3 42.7
Expert expects Unknown (84.5% of responses) 28.6 71.4
TABLE 3 | Expert’s Pre-Test judgments of what Day 2 Partner knows and
does not know, compared to the names Partner actually learned on Day 1
(Game Experience).
Learned (%) Didn’t learn (%)
SAME PARTNER
Expert expects Known (33.8% of responses) 98 2
Expert expects Unknown (66.2% of responses) 49.4 50.6
DIFFERENT PARTNER
Expert expects Known (15.5% of responses) 88.3 11.7
Expert expects Unknown (84.5% of responses) 48.2 51
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fact that most participants had relatively similar performance
(and thus learned similar names) during Day 1. Thus, while
Experts’ judgments regarding the likelihood that their partner
knows a name reflect partner-specific information, they are still
relatively accurate for new partners, based on their implicit sense
of which names were likely to have been learned during the
game.
2.2.2. Patterns of Referring Expression Choice during
Matching Task
In order to explore whether the partner’s use of referring
expressions could have provided a useful cue to the Expert
regarding that partner’s knowledge, we annotated the transcripts
from the Matching task, coding each reference to a named
feature or creature as either an N, an N+D , or a D. If a
creature was referred to using a description that included the
feature name (e.g., “The Wug with the Bor” in reference to
the creature Molgiroo, a “Wug” family creature with the “Bor”
feature), this was coded as an N for the feature and a D for the
creature; features could also be described rather than named, as
in “The Wug with the thing that looks like a rocket,” and this
would be coded as a D for both the feature and the creature.
Because of the nature of the matching task, participants were
sometimes able to complete the task without referring to all of
the creatures; these were coded as “NONE.” We then recorded
the final utterance type from the naive participant referring
to that feature or creature (N, D or N+D). This gave us a
measure of the evidence provided by the participants’ utterances.
Figure 2 shows the distribution of the partners’ first utterances
during the Matching task for known and unknown creatures and
features.
For items whose names the partner did know, according to the
partner’s Pre-Test, the partner used the N form 37% of the time,
the N+D form 9% of the time, and the D form 48% of the time.
FIGURE 2 | Distribution of naive participants’ utterances for known and
unknown creatures and features in the Matching task.
The vast majority of names used by the partner were for features;
81% of the partner’s N uses and 53% of the partner’s N+D uses
were for features rather than for creatures. Note that the partners
here are using the N form more often than the N+D form for
the names they know; this is likely due to the fact that they are
interacting with people whom they know to be Experts, and so
can safely refer using only the name. Experts almost never used
names during the Matching Task, which was almost certainly
driven by the fact that they were playing the role of matcher
rather than director.
Note that there are a small percentage of N and N+D
uses by the partner for “unknown” items. In all cases where
the participant used the N form for an “unknown” item, the
participant initially used an incorrect form of the name (and had
done so during the Pre-Test as well), and the Expert provided a
correction, which the partner then proceeded to use throughout
the task, as in the following example:
Partner: The next one has a Rep on it...
Expert: Do you mean Rab? The half-star?
Partner: Oh yes, sorry, Rab!
In sum, partners did not use names for all of the items
whose names were known to them during the Matching task,
but they did use some names. In choosing to use names for
particular items, partners may have provided evidence to the
Expert regarding their knowledge not only of that item, but
of other items that should have been learned alongside it.
Likewise, in deciding to use a description for an item, partners
may have provided evidence to the Expert that suggested a
lack of knowledge of that item’s name, evidence that could be
misleading if the name is actually known by the partner. Did this
evidence contribute to changes in Experts’ beliefs about partner
knowledge? In the next section, we provide an overview of the
changes in Experts’ beliefs about what their partner did and did
not know, and evaluate the extent to which these changes can
be predicted by the evidence provided by the partner during the
Matching Task.
2.2.3. Changes in Experts’ Beliefs at Mid-Test
In order to explore the changes in Experts’ beliefs about
partner knowledge and the extent to which these changes were
driven by the evidence provided in the Matching Task, we first
converted the Experts’ likelihood estimates from the Mid-Test
into YES/NO judgments in the same manner as for the Pre-
Test estimates. We find that in the Mid-Test, the difference
between Experts’ accuracy on YES/NO judgments for same Day
2 partner vs. different Day 2 partner disappear: Experts were
correct in their judgments around 79% of the time for both
types of partner, meaning that Experts’ accuracy for different
Day 2 partners improved by 10% over their performance in the
Pre-Test.
A summary of the Experts’ judgment data from the Mid-Test,
broken down by the items the partner did and did not actually
know, is given in Table 4.
An examination of Table 4 in comparison to Table 2 reveals
some interesting changes. Most striking are the improvements
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TABLE 4 | Experts’ Mid-Test Judgements relative to Partners’ Pre-Test
Memory for names.
Knows (%) Doesn’t Know (%)
SAME PARTNER
Expert expects Known (22.3% of responses) 80.7 19.3
Expert expects Unknown (77.7% of responses) 21.1 78.9
DIFFERENT PARTNER
Expert expects Known (14.6% of responses) 90.6 9.4
Expert expects Unknown (85.4% of responses) 23.2 76.8
in Experts’ judgments regarding the knowledge of their partner
when their partner was different on Day 2; for different partners,
Experts correctly believe things to be known when they are in fact
known 90.6% of the time in the Mid-Test, compared to 57.3% of
the time in the Pre-Test. The “Curse of Knowledge”-type errors
are reduced when working with the same partner, as well: Experts
correctly believe things to be known when they are in fact known
80.7% of the time in the Mid-Test compared to 72.4% of the time
in the Pre-Test.
In order to assess whether these differences reflected
significant improvements in judgements from the Pre-Test to the
Mid-Test, we used a mixed effects logistic regression model to
predict whether the YES/NO value of the Expert’s judgment was
correct, with the test from which that judgment came (Pre-Test
orMid-Test) and the partner status (same Day 2 or different Day
2) as fixed effects and participant number, item name, and Expert
name as random slopes and intercepts. We found a significant
main effect of judgment type on accuracy, such that judgments
that came from the Pre-Test were less likely to be accurate than
judgments that came from theMid-Test (β = −0.58, S.E.= 0.18,
p < 0.01).
To test whether Experts’ Mid-Test judgments were influenced
by the evidence provided in the form of their partner’s referring
expression choices, we used a mixed effects multi-level regression
model to predict the Expert’s Mid-Test Yes/No judgment for
each item, with the referring expression choice of the partner for
that item (N, N+D, D, or none) as a fixed effect and participant
number, item name, and Expert name as random slopes and
intercepts. Experts were significantly more likely to rate an item
as “known” when the partner had used the N form to refer to
the item (β = 6.45, S.E. = 0.82, p < 0.0001) and also when
the partner had used an N+D form (β = 3.97, S.E. = 0.86,
p < 0.0001), and were significantly less likely to rate an item as
“known” when the partner had used a description (β = −4.04,
S.E.= 0.52, p < 0.0001).
We had hoped to test whether Experts would alter their belief
about the status of one item based on the evidence provided
in relation to another item. However, the patterns of referring
expression choice by the partners made that impossible; there
were not enough cases where a partner used a name from “later”
in the game without also having used one from earlier in the
game. There was one striking example, in which the Expert
was working with a different partner on Day 2 than he had
worked with on Day 1. This partner had made it to the end
of the game on Day 1, and during the Matching Task, used
names for some, but not all of the creatures she had encountered.
She did, however, refer to the final creature from the Day 1
game as “King Floogelor” during the Matching Task, and the
Expert reacted with surprise that she knew that name. In this
particular case, the Expert dramatically increased his ratings on
the Mid-Test (compared to the Pre-Test) for all items. But this
was the only example of this type in the dataset. In order to
ask specifically about whether the use of one name can lead
to generalizations about knowledge of other names, it may be
necessary to use partially-scripted games; we present one such
approach in Experiment 2.
2.2.4. Patterns of Referring Expression and Set
Choice during SET Task
In order to explore whether these changes in beliefs about partner
knowledge were reflected in the Expert’s referring expression
choices during the SET task, we used the same annotation and
coding scheme as for the transcripts for the Matching Task,
additionally coding the first utterance type from the Expert.
Figure 3 gives the distribution of utterance types (N, ND, D,
and none) during the SET task for partners and for Experts,
respectively.
Unlike the Matching task, Experts used many names during
the SET task, restricting their use of names to those items
that were actually known by their partner; this was aided by
their updated beliefs regarding their partner’s knowledge. Models
using the Expert’sMid-Test judgments to predict the choice of the
N-form in the SET task are a better fit (based on AIC) than those
using the Expert’s Pre-Test judgments. The connection to the
evidence provided by the partner is strong: when we use the form
of referring expression chosen by the partner in the Matching
Task to predict the form of referring expression chosen by the
Expert in the SET Task, we find that Experts are significantly
more likely to use the N-form when the partner used the N-
form (β = 4.94, S.E. = 0.72, p < 0.001) or the N+D form
(β = 3.27, S.E. = 0.95, p < 0.001) for that item. The handful of
instances in which an N form was used for an unknown-to-the-
partner item occurred on the final turns of the SET game; at that
point it was obvious which card remained, and so the utterance
could be understood by the partner even without knowing the
name.
2.3. Experiment 1 General Discussion
Experts’ initial beliefs regarding their Day 2 partner’s knowledge
of names did reflect partner-specific information, as evidenced by
the higher accuracy of their Pre-Test judgements when working
with the same Day 2 partner as when working with a different
Day 2 partner. When working with unfamiliar partners on Day
2, Experts’ initial beliefs regarding those partner’s knowledge was
influenced by the Experts’ game-playing experience, and thus still
more accurate than might be expected if the Experts’ had no basis
for forming expectations regarding their partners’ knowledge.
The partner’s referring expression choices during the initial
referential communication task did provide useful information
regarding the partner’s knowledge of names, but partner did not
always use the N form for names that were known. Experts were
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FIGURE 3 | Distribution of partner’s and Expert’s utterances for known and unknown creatures and features in the SET task.
able to use the information provided by the form of their partner’s
referring expressions to generate more accurate beliefs regarding
their partner’s knowledge of names, which was apparent both in
Mid-Test and Post-Test explicit judgements, and in the form of
referring expression chosen by the Expert in the final SET task.
There are limitations inherent to the design of this study.
Because we used only two Experts, it is difficult to draw general
conclusions about what people with expertise do when speaking
to those whose knowledge only partly overlaps with their own.
Another concern is that by explicitly asking the Experts to
make repeated judgments about their partner’s likely knowledge,
we highlighted the issue of partner knowledge for the Experts
in a way that typical conversation does not, and thus made
that information more available and salient, which Galati and
Brennan (2010) argue is a key factor for finding evidence of CG-
use; over the course of the experiment, each Expert was asked to
complete 16 Pre-Tests, 16Mid-Tests, and 16 Post-Tests regarding
their partners’ knowledge. We can’t argue that these tests did not
bias the Experts toward more careful attention to their partner’s
knowledge state, but the results of Experiment 1 do show that
it is possible for people to attend to the evidence provided by
their fellow interlocutor in the form of their choice of referring
expression in order to update their beliefs regarding what is and
is not shared, and can use this information in deciding how to
refer in subsequent conversation.
What Experiment 1 could not reveal is whether interlocutors
were capable of generalizing on the basis of their partner’s
displayed knowledge. In Experiment 2 we explored this
possibility using a partially-scripted online game 2 that
specifically promotes the use of the N+D form.
3. EXPERIMENT 2: CG BELIEF-UPDATING
IN A PARTIALLY-SCRIPTED DIALOG TASK
In Experiment 2, we investigated whether a partner’s use of a
name could lead an interlocutor to generalize about the other
knowledge that partner may have. We developed a simplified
name-learning game that shared some critical properties with
the game in Experiment 1. This game was posted as a “HIT”
on Amazon Mechanical Turk, allowing us to obtain data from a
larger population. Participants learn the names of creatures while
solving increasingly more challenging timed math problems, and
then must choose between the Red Path or the Blue Path, and
once they choose, they cannot learn names on the alternate
path. Thus, participants’ knowledge at the end of the game
varies, depending both on their ability to solve math problems,
and on their choice of path if they make it far enough into
the game—a situation that mirrors the one created by the
dice rolls and choice points in Experiment 1. Following the
name-learning game, participants were asked to take part in a
referential communication game with another participant from
the name-learning game. This second game player was actually
an automated agent, who we will call AutoTurk, programmed
with particular experiences from the game: in one condition
(RedExpert), AutoTurk was an expert who made it all the
way to the end of the Red Path; in another (BlueExpert),
AutoTurk made it all the way to the end of the Blue Path; and
in the third (EarlyFailure), AutoTurk was a poor player, who
failed out of the game by solving a math problem incorrectly
after learning only two character names. We collected data
regarding how participants shifted their expectations regarding
partner knowledge during the course of conversation, both via
explicit judgments and via their referring expression choices. We
hypothesized that upon hearing a partner use a name for an item
from the Red Path, participants would be more likely to believe
their partner knows other Red Path names, and less likely to
believe their partner knows Blue Path names.
3.1. Methods
3.1.1. Participants
Hundred and twenty naive adult speakers of English volunteered
to participate in the study for payment via Amazon Mechanical
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Turk. Prior to accepting the Mechanical Turk “HIT,” participants
gave consent via a digital consent form approved by the Research
Subjects Review Board of our institution.
3.2. Materials
Three novel clipart images of “cute monsters” from clipart.com
were modified to create seven unique creatures from three
families, each with invented names, as in Experiment 1. These
creatures were presented over the course of game, whose layout is
depicted in Figure 4. A template was used to generate five unique
math problems for each participant. They were asked to solve the
problems to progress through the game; each “splat” symbol on
the game paths represents a math problem.
3.3. Procedure
3.3.0.1. Instructions
The participant, prior to accepting the HIT, read instructions
describing the game, its rules and payout structure. Each
participant was informed that they would be playing a game that
involved two separate stages: learning the names of the cartoon
creatures while solving math problems, then playing a matching
game with a networked partner who had also completed the
first stage. They would acquire points for each correctly learned
name and correctly solved math problem during the first stage;
these points would carry over into the second stage, where they
would acquire points based on howwell they solved the matching
game with their partner. Participants were also told that if they
successfully completed Stage 1 (by making it to the end of either
path), they would receive a bonus payout (“Bonus 1”); another
bonus payout (“Bonus 2”) was based on the total number points
across Stage 1 and Stage 2 combined.
3.3.0.2. Stage 1
The participant was presented with the game screen, and
introduced to the first character, as depicted in Figure 4, and
told to remember its name. They were then given 8 s to solve a
simple addition problem; if successful, they advanced to the next
round of the game, and were introduced to another creature. The
FIGURE 4 | Game Layout/Introduction of First Creature; each box
represents a character whose name could be learned, while each
“splat” represents a timed math problem to be solved. The top path
(“Red Path”) had more challenging math problems and a higher payout.
math problems were designed to have the form X + Y, where X
and Y were both single digit numbers for the problems that were
solved prior to the path-split. For the last two problems, solved
after the path-split, X and Y were both double digit numbers if
the participant had chosen the Red Path, while only one of X
or Y was a double-digit number if the participant had chosen
the Blue Path. Participants were made aware that the choice of
the Red Path would entail more difficult math problems, but a
higher Bonus 1 payout. If the participant successfully reached
the “midpoint” of the game (after learning the third creature),
they were given a Mid-test: they had to choose each creatures’
name from a list of four possibilities. If successful, they were
given a choice between the Red Path and the Blue Path. If the
participant successfully learned both names on their chosen path,
they were given a final test in which they had to again choose
each creatures’ name from a list of four possibilities before they
could complete the path and advance to the Practice Phase. If
the participant incorrectly solved a math problem or failed to
successfully complete the Mid-test, their time in Stage 1 ended,
and they were advanced into the Practice Phase—this allowed us
to create a believable scenario in which a random participant in
the game could know anywhere from 0 to 5 names.
3.3.0.3. Practice phase
To ensure that participants remembered the names they had just
learned, they were next presented with a series of single creatures
in random order, as well as a list of 10 possible names (three were
“distractor” names that did not belong to any creature), along
with the options “did not learn” and “do not remember.” For each
creature, the participant needed to correctly identify its name if
it was a creature they had learned, or correctly identify it as an
unlearned name if it was a name they had not learned. If the
participant chose an incorrect name, or chose “do not remember”
for a name they had learned, they were reminded of the creature’s
name; if they chose any name at all for a creature they had not
learned, they were reminded of the fact that they did not learn it.
For each creature, the participant needed to correctly identify its
name (or status as an unlearned creature) twice before advancing
to Stage 2.
3.3.0.4. Stage 2
Participants were told that they were being connected to another
Mechanical Turk “worker” who had also participated in Stage 1
of the game, and were shown a “wait” symbol and a progress
bar, which changed to a “connection” symbol after a random
time lag of between 2 and 90 s; in reality, they were “connected”
to AutoTurk (the automated agent described earlier). Then,
participants were asked to give YES/NO judgments regarding
their expectation that their random partner would know each of
the seven creatures. Next, participants were told they would be
playing a matching game with their partner (who was actually
AutoTurk). When it was the participants’ turn to be the director,
they were shown a single creature; their job was to decide how
to refer to that creature so that their partner (actually AutoTurk)
could correctly identify it from an array of four creatures.
On director trials, participants were presented with a list of 10
names and a list of 10 descriptions from which they could choose
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using radio buttons. They were told that if their partner chose the
correct creature based on what they said, they would receive 8
points by default; if they used a name along with a description,
they’d receive 5 bonus points, and if they used just the name,
they’d receive 10 bonus points. If their partner chose the wrong
creature based on what they’d said, they’d lose 10 points (Thus,
using the name by itself if the partner does not know it
would result in losing 10 points instead of gaining 18). The
participant took turns with AutoTurk playing the role of director
or matcher; when the participant was the matcher, they saw four
creatures on the screen, and were presented with the referring
expression their partner (actually AutoTurk) had selected: either
N, N+D, or D. When the participant was the matcher, they
received 10 points for selecting the correct item based on
AutoTurk’s utterance, and lost 10 points if they chose the
wrong one.
Critically, the trials (shown in Table 5) were ordered such
that it was possible for the AutoTurk to use either an N+D or
a D form for particular creatures, which could then serve as a
cue to the participant about whether their partner knew those
creatures; in Trial 4 (a Blue Path creature), BlueExpert uses an
N+D while RedExpert uses a D, and in Trial 6 (a Red Path
creature), BlueExpert uses a D while RedExpert uses an N+D.
Since participants should only choose the N form for a particular
creature if they believed their partner actually knew the name,
this allowed us to use subsequent choices between N and N+D
for creatures the participant knew as a measure of their beliefs
regarding their partner’s knowledge.
3.3.0.5. Post-Tests
To allow us to track whether participant’s explicit judgements
of their partner’s knowledge shifted as a result of playing the
referential communication game, the participant again made
YES/NO judgments regarding their belief that the partner they
had worked with knew each of the creatures. They were also
asked whether they had paid attention to whether their partner
used names, and were asked to describe their own strategy for
completing the game in Stage 2, and what strategy they thought
their partner was using.
TABLE 5 | Experiment 2: Stage 2 Trials.
Trial Utterance Form/AutoTurk Knowledge
RedExpert BlueExpert EarlyFailure
1. Flazzeroo Participant’s Choice
2. Floogirep N+D N+D D
3. Gramperoo Participant’s Choice
4. Bampirep (Final Blue) D N+D D
5. Molgirep (Blue) Participant’s Choice
6. Narpelor (Final Red) N+D D D
7. Trimmelor (Red) Participant’s Choice
8. Flazzeroo N N N
9. Narpelor (Final Red) Participant’s Choice
10. Gramperoo N N N
3.4. Results
3.4.1. Explicit Judgments of Partner Knowledge
One issue worth noting is that 7% of participants, in the Post-
Test, gave Yes judgments to all of the creatures; they indicated
that they believed the partner they had worked with knew all of
the creatures from the Red Path and from the Blue Path, which is
impossible. This suggests that at least some participants did not
recognize the path split during Stage 1 for what it was, and thus
eliminates any expectation that these participants could draw an
inference from the fact that the AutoTurk used a name from
one of the two paths. Another 6% of participants gave responses
that indicated they believed their partner knew creatures from
later in the game but not creatures from earlier in the game: this
also indicates a lack of attention to (or memory for) the overall
structure of the game. These participants were excluded from our
analyses.
We first compared participants’ judgments regarding
AutoTurk’s knowledge collected prior to Stage 2 to those
collected in the Post-Test. If participants were behaving
optimally, then we should expect that when interacting with
RedExpert, participants’ judgments should shift toward YES
for Trimmelor and Narpelor and toward NO for Molgirep and
Bampirep. When interacting with BlueExpert, participants’
judgments should show the opposite pattern. And finally, when
interacting with EarlyFailure, participants should show shifts
toward NO for all of the late-stage creatures. These patterns
are indeed present in the data. We used a linear mixed effects
regression model to predict whether the change from Stage 1 to
Stage 2 judgments would be positive for individual creatures,
with the AutoTurk’s knowledge status as a fixed effect and
the path chosen by the participant as a random effect. For
Trimmelor (a Red Path creature), we found that participants
interacting with BlueExpert were significantly less likely to have
a positive shift (β = −1.5, S.E. = 0.4, p < 0.001), as were
participants interacting with EarlyFailure (β = −0.41, S.E =
0.17, p < 0.05); participants interacting with RedExpert were
significantly more likely to have a positive shift (β = 0.89, S.E =
0.14, p < 0.001). For Narpelor (another Red Path creature), we
found a similar pattern; participants interacting with RedExpert
were significantly more likely to have a positive shift (β = 0.81,
S.E. = 0.13, p < 0.001) while participants interacting with
EarlyFailure were significantly less likely to have a positive shift
(β = −0.3, S.E= 0.14, p < 0.05), as were participants interacting
with BlueExpert (β = −1.09, S.E. = 0.29, p < 0.0001). Overall,
participants judgments following Stage 2 do reflect the evidence
provided by AutoTurk’s utterances.
3.4.2. Referring Expression Choice
In order to look at the choice of referring expression in a
meaningful way, it was necessary to restrict all analyses to only
those individuals who actually knew the relevant name for that
trial, and because most participants chose the higher-paying Red
Path, we focus our analyses on Trials 7 and 9, in which the target
creatures are the two late-stage Red Path creatures. As shown in
Table 5, both of these trials followed references to Blue and Red
path creatures, and the form of the referring expression used by
AutoTurk for those creatures varied depending on AutoTurk’s
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FIGURE 5 | Distribution of participants’ utterance types when interacting with EarlyFailure, RedExpert, or BlueExpert for Trial 7 and Trial 9 (referring to
Red Path creature.)
knowledge. Figure 5 shows the distribution of utterance types
chosen by participants for Trimmelor (Trial 7) and Narpelor
(Trial 9).
For each trial, we used a mixed effects logistic regression
model to predict whether the participant would use the N form
for the target creature, with AutoTurk’s knowledge as a fixed
effect and the path chosen by the participant as a random
effect. For Trial 7, we found that participants interacting with
BlueExpert were significantly less likely to use the N form
(β = −2.39, S.E. = 1.15, p < 0.01). However, we did not
find any significant difference in the likelihood of using the
N form between participants interacting with RedExpert and
EarlyFailure; even when participants interact EarlyFailure, they
appear to be as likely to use the N form as participants who
interacted with RedExpert, who has already used a name for
a (later) Red Path creature. Thus, the results of Trial 7 only
partially support the hypothesis that participants are sensitive to
their partners’ use of name and adapt their choice of referring
expression accordingly. Note, however, that EarlyFailure simply
uses descriptions all of the time, and that this is not solid evidence
of a lack of name knowledge the way that using a name for a
creature from the other path is.
For Trial 9, we found that participants interacting with
RedExpert were significantly more likely to choose the N form
(β = 2.7, S.E. = 1.2, p < 0.05) than any others, and participants
interacting with BlueExpertwere significantly less likely to choose
the N form (β = −2.6, S.E. = 1.3, p < 0.05). Thus, at
least in the final trial of the experiment, and for an item whose
name RedExpert had used in an N+D form in a previous trial,
participants do seem to take AutoTurk’s knowledge into account
in their choice to use a name.
We also examined participants’ Post-Test descriptions of their
own strategy and their beliefs regarding their partner’s strategy.
Here, we found that most participants focused on the memory-
related challenges of the task, commenting on how they kept
the creatures’ names straight and on how difficult that was.
But based on the participants’ post-hoc reflections on strategy,
some individuals believed themselves to be sensitive to the
information shared by their partner in the form of their choice
of referring expression, and were aiming to make “optimal”
referring expression choices based on that information. Many
of these participants commented that they thought their partner
was using the same strategy, but “doing a better job of it.” But
as we noted, the primary focus of participants in their Post-
Test comments was on the challenges posed by the memory
task; this may suggest that the basis for the inferences we were
interested in testing (the overall structure of the game and
the names contained within it) was either not recognized or
misremembered by some participants.
3.5. Experiment 2 Discussion
Participants were able to generate more accurate beliefs regarding
what their partner knew following interaction with that partner.
In the Post-Test, participants changed their beliefs in the
expected direction given the knowledge displayed by AutoTurk;
thus, even in this simplified game environment, participants are
capable of using their partner’s utterances to arrive at a more
accurate set of beliefs regarding their partner’s knowledge.
The participants’ referring expression choices also support
our generalization hypothesis: in the final trial, we found that
participants were significantly more likely to use a name to
refer to final Red Path creature if they were interacting with
RedExpert. Preceding trials paint a somewhat messier picture
regarding the relationship between AutoTurk’s utterances and
the participants’ choice of referring expression, particularly in
the case of participants interacting with EarlyFailure. However,
it’s worth remembering that in Experiment 1, participants’ use
of names did not fully reflect their knowledge; participants often
used descriptions even when they did, in fact, know the names. In
the context of Experiment 2, this means that it is not necessarily
valid to make the inference that because EarlyFailure used a
description, it must not know the name. But we still would have
expected participants interacting with EarlyFailure to use the
N+D form, rather than using names by themselves, given the
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 12 February 2016 | Volume 7 | Article 212
Gegg-Harrison and Tanenhaus What’s in a Name?
lack of evidence for knowing names. Still, participants interacting
with BlueExpert were the least likely to use names; it seems that
participants could in fact generalize from BlueExpert’s use of the
N+D form for a Blue Path creature, and infer that BlueExpert
could not possibly know the name of a Red Path creature.
Given the extent to which the kinds of belief updating
we are interested in would depend on both accurate mental
representations of the structure of the knowledge domain
and attention to the partner’s utterances, the combination of
Mechanical Turk and novel knowledge may not have been
a good one. Though many psychological findings have been
successfully replicated using Mechanical Turk (e.g., Munro et al.,
2010; Crump et al., 2013), the Mechanical Turk platform by
itself does nothing to promote attention to the task unless the
creator of the HIT creates incentives in the form of bonuses
for work that meets some kind of standard. But in developing
the bonus scheme to motivate participants to attend to the
task in Experiment 1, we might have been probing participants’
gambling behavior, rather than their conversational behavior:
would a participant be willing to risk losing 10 points for the
chance of gaining 18? What if the point spread were different?
And indeed, many participants commented on making this
calculation as if it were a bet, when they described their strategy in
the Post-Test.
Even more important, though, is the difficulty that
participants had remembering the names and the overall
structure of the game in Stage 1. Based on their Pre-Test
responses, participants struggled to remember which creature
was which, and many of them seemed not to remember the
order in which creatures were learned (or even that the path split
meant that some creatures could not be learned together), and
thus it seems unlikely that the kinds of memory associations that
would be necessary in order for category-related cues to be useful
for referring expression choice would even be present for these
participants. These memory and knowledge-structure issues are
crucial areas for future work; it seems likely, for example, that
a sleep interval may be necessary in order to develop the kinds
of concept associations necessary for these inferences (Stickgold
and Walker, 2013; Landmann et al., 2014).
4. GENERAL DISCUSSION
Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrate that interlocutors are capable
of using information gained over the course of conversation,
particularly the information conveyed by the partner’s choice
of referring expression, to update their expectations regarding
what knowledge is shared with their partner, and that these
belief updates influence speakers’ choice of referring expressions
during subsequent conversation. In Experiment 2, we found
some evidence for generalization, in that participants interacting
with BlueExpert were the least likely to use the N form for a
subsequent reference to a Red Path creature; the demonstrated
knowledge of Blue Path names allowed participants to generalize
to a necessary lack of knowledge of Red Path names. These
findings have important implications for theories of CG use
during conversation.
In many theories, the distinction between knowing that a
referent is in CG (and is thus something to which the speaker
could felicitously refer) and knowing that a particular means
of referring to that referent is likely to be understood by the
addressee, seems to be either blurred or non-existent. Yet even
in those cases where an object is clearly in CG via a cue like visual
co-presence (as in “cubbyhole” studies, e.g., Keysar et al., 2000),
the speaker still has to decide what to call it. Even for common
nouns, we usually have a choice regarding which to use to refer to
a particular item: do we call something a cassette or a tape? While
a number of factors influence this decision (word frequency, the
other items in the display, etc), one of these should surely be
whether or not the addressee is familiar with the link between
a particular expression and the referent. This is especially true for
proper names, which are arbitrary labels for a referent, and can
only be understood by those who know about the link between
the label and the referent. But it seems possible that various
kinds of referring expressions could come to serve, under certain
circumstances, as context-dependent conventions for referring
(in other words, as context-dependent names), and this may be
a way of connecting the work presented here to studies of lexical
precedents or conceptual pacts (e.g., Metzing and Brennan, 2003;
Brown-Schmidt, 2009). Partner-specific expectations relating to
the means of referring could also play a role in comprehension,
and in pilot work building off Wolter et al. (2011), we are
currently exploring whether a speaker’s use of a scalar contrast
(e.g., the big candle) generates an expectation that the contrast
item will be called the small candle even when the contrast is no
longer present, by looking for reduced cohort competition effects
with a competitor like candy.
We suggest that what is truly needed in an account of CG for
definite reference is not triple co-presence of the sort described
by Clark and Marshall (1978, 1981), but rather, quadruple co-
presence: there must be some record in memory that links the
speaker, the addressee, the object, and a particular means of
referring to that object in order for a speaker to have a reasonable
expectations that their use of thatmeans of referring to that object
will be understood by their addressee. Community membership
can provide a powerful cue to such co-presence; we can often
safely assume that certain means of referring to objects will be
known by people by virtue of who they are and the communities
to which they belong. This does not necessarily require any
elaborate representations along the lines of the reference diaries
proposed by Clark andMarshall; indeed, if this kind of knowledge
can be drawn upon via the associative mechanisms proposed by
Horton andGerrig (2005a,b), it could underlie the kinds of belief-
updating we described earlier. If we learn through conversation
that our partner is the member of a particular community, this
may trigger associations with the kinds of knowledge members
of that community have (both in terms of referents and in terms
of means of referring to those referents) that could lead to more
accurate estimates of CG. And in particular, the evidence that
could trigger such associations could come through our partner’s
use of an N+D form, as suggested by the results of Experiments
1 and 2, since that form enables speakers to display knowledge
of a name without making any assumptions about whether it is
shared with their addressee.
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But not all displays of knowledge are equivalent. Finding out
that an interlocutor knows the name Statue of Liberty or guitar
is not particularly informative, as nearly any speaker of English
would know those names. But evidence that the speaker knows
the name South Street Seaport or viol da gamba should cause
their conversational partner to shift toward believing their fellow
interlocutor has expertise with New York City landmarks or
Renaissance-era stringed instruments, respectively. If language
comprehension is, in part, a process of trying to explain why
the speaker said what they said the way that they said it (as
in, e.g., Hobbs et al., 1993), then the explanation we seek may
be rooted in what we think the speaker knows. Bayesian belief-
updating could provide a useful framework for exploring the
extent to which interlocutors use evidence to generate such
explanations in a rational way, based on the informativity of
the evidence provided by their partner. We have ample evidence
that during interactive conversation, interlocutors adapt their
expectations regarding such things as the likelihood of particular
syntactic constructions (e.g., Kleinschmidt et al., 2012; Fine et al.,
2013) or of particular phonetic realizations (e.g., Kleinschmidt
and Jaeger, 2015), and both of these adaptation phenomena
have been successfully explored using Bayesian belief-updating
models. Future work in this area should focus on understanding
the process by which people generate, update, and generalize
beyond their prior expectations regarding partner knowledge;
games like the ones used in Experiments 1 and 2 may provide
a fruitful paradigm for exploring these processes in more detail,
particularly as they relate to the relative informativity of a
particular knowledge-display.
The choice of referring expression is a valuable tool for
exploring questions about how we use CG. Even in those cases
where an object is physically co-present and therefore can be
referred to using a definite NP, speakers still must decide what to
call it; thus, it is crucial not to think about CG simply in terms of
what interlocutors know about what their conversational partner
can see, but to also consider what interlocutors believe about
what their partner knows. What’s in a name? Evidence about
knowledge.
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